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KYBERNETIKA — VOLUME 11 (1975), NUMBER 1 
States of Affairs as Values for Formulas 
MlROSLAV MLEZIVA 
States of affairs are constructed as pairs consisting of a (relational) structure S and of a subset 
of the set of structures similar to S. This concept is adequate to the intuitively motivated relation 
of strong equivalence (identity of states of affairs). Some semantical applications are mentioned. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value. But it 
is not intuitively adequate that a truth-value is what a sentence speaks about (or 
possibly: its denotatum). The sentences, e.g., 
The Earth is round John is human 
have the same value, but we feel that they speak about different things. 
Many authors have required that there must be some entities as facts or states of 
affairs about which sentences speak (Wittgenstein [1], Russell [2; 3], Reichenbach 
[4], Baylis [5], etc.). But there is no exact formulation of facts or states of affairs. 
In some earlier papers we have proposed an experimental construction of states 
of affairs as ontologica! correspondents of sentences (closed formulas). In the present 
paper a generalized theory for formulas of any kind is developed. 
We will prefer that states of affairs are possible states constructed as entities of 
the extensional (setrtheoretical) ontological domain. The states of affairs are assigned 
not only to true and simple (atomic) formulas but — in contrast to B. Russell — to 
formulas of any form (atomic, compound, general, etc.) as their state-values. 
Our problem consists in answering two questions: 1) when two formulas have the 
same state of affairs as their value -and 2) what entity is the state of affairs (the con-
structive definition of state of affairs). 
2. THE LANGUAGE L AND ITS METALANGUAGE 
The object of our interest is an arbitrary applied first-order language L of the pred-
icate calculus with identity. The metalanguage ML of L contains the letters 
A, B, C, D, Au Bu Cu Du A2, ... 
as variables for expressions of L. ML is essentially the language of set theory with 
the following constants: 
' -+' (implication), ' ~ ' (negation), ' v ' (disjunction), '&' (conjunction), ' = ' (equi-
valence), ' ( . . . ) ' , ' (£•••) ' (universal and existential quantifiers), ' = ' (identity), 'e ' 
(membershiprelation), '(.?.) ' , '(. ' .-) ' (abstraction-operators),'{...}' (sign of n-tuple), 
'< . . .> ' (sign of ordered n-tuple), ' x ' (cartesian product), '0 ' (empty set). 
First we use the sign ' ' for construction of names of expressions (both of L and 
ML). When this sign is applied to metavariables (or to meta-metavariables) or to 
compound expressions containing metavariables, we mean, e.g. by 'A', 'A = B\ '~A' 
in fact the metavariables: "an arbitrary L-expression A", "an arbitrary L-formulaof 
the form A = B", "an arbitrary L-formula of the form ~A", etc. 
The language Lnow contains the following primitive signs: 
logical constants: '=>', '~\\ ' + ' , ' . ' , 'o\ '(V )', '(3 )', ' = '; 
specific constants (individuals): 'a^, 'a2\ ..., 'a„'; 
(predicates): ,P1\ 'P2\ ..., 'Pm ' ; 
Variables: 'JCX', 'x2\ ...,'x„\... 
We suppose that a predicate constant 'P ( ' is fc,-ary. The number of variables is 
unlimited. 
The concepts of L-formula, L-sentence and other syntactical concepts are defined 
in the ordinary manner. The result of replacing ' £ ' by ' C in ' A ' will be denoted as 
follows 'A(BjC)' (analogically in other cases). 
3. ONTOLOGY, INTERPRETATION AND VALUATION 
Now, we suppose the existence of a domain of objects called ontology constructed 
in agreement with principles of set theory. The variables for objects of ontology are 
the following: a, fi, y, au pu yu a2, . . . 
Two truth-values (truth and falsehood) will be denoted as follows: 
t,f. 
The metalanguage ML is a many-sorted language. We have seen two sorts of 
variables. Other sorts will appear later. 
Definition 1. The interpretation of L is a function I assigning 
1. to every variable the same nonempty set D' (domain of I) and 
2. to every constant ' A ' exactly one entity 1(A) (denotatum of'A' in I) such that: 
if ' A ' is an individual constant, then 7(A) e D'; if ' A ' is a k-ary predicate, then 
1(A) c D1 x . . . x D'. 
k-times 
We will use the following symbols as the variables for interpretations: 
I,K,J,IUKUJUI2,... 
Definition 2. The valuation of variables in I is function V(or V') assigning 
to every variable ' A ' exactly one entity V(A) such that V(A) e D'. The entity V(A) 
is called the value of'A' in V'. 
We will use the following symbols as the variables for valuations in I: 
V,U, W, VUUU Wu V2,... 
(with index I, K etc., or without index, when the use in a given context is clear). 
Now we will define the general concept of the value in I and Vfor every expression 
of L(i.e. constants, variables and formulas of L). We denote this value o f ' A ' in J and 
V by '4(A)'. 
Definition 3 . 
(la) / / ' A ' is a constant, then v'v(A) = I (A). 
(lb) If'A' is a variable, then 4 ( A ) = V'(A). 
(2) If'A' is a k-ary predicate and ' A / , ..., 'Ak' are individual terms, then 
v'v(A(Au ..., Ak)) = t m <4(A . ) . ..., v'v(Ak)y e v'v(A) . 
(3) If ' A ' and 'B' are individual terms, then 
V'y(A = B) = t = V'V(A) = V'V(B) . 
(4) If ' A ' is a formula, then 
v'v(-\A) = t = 4(A) * t. 
(5) If ' A ' and 'B' are formulas, then 
v'v(A => B) = t = v'v(A) - 4 ( B ) • 
(6) If'A' is a formula and 'x ; ' is a variable, then 
Vy((VXl)A) = t = 4 ( A ) = t, 
for every valuation U' differing from Vat most in the value for 'x ; ' . 
6 (7) If'A'is a formula, then i 
v'v(A) ± t = v
r;(A) = f. 
(For conjunction, disjunction, equivalence and existential quantifier the rules 
of values are as customary.) 
In the known manner other semantical concepts are defined: 
Definition 4. If 'A' is a formula , then 
'A' is satisfied by V1 = vv(A) = t; 
VER'(A) =(V)(vv(A) = t) ('A' is true in I); 
FALS\A) m (V)(vv(A) = f) ('A' is false in I); 
L-VER(A) = (I) (V) (vv(A) = t) ('A'is L-true); 
L-FALS(A) =(l)(V)(vTv(A)=f) ('A'is L-false); 
EQ'(A, B) = (V)(vv(A = B) = t) ('A', 'B' are equivalent, in I); 
L-EQ(A ,B) m (I) (V) (vv(A = B) = t) ('A', 'B' are L-equivalent). 
4. THE TRANSLATION OF L-FORMULAS IN ML 
The ML-terms 'v^a^f,..., 'vv(a„)', '»£(?«,)', •••, 'vv(Pm)', '^K(
XI)'> •••> '4C*p)'> •••> 
etc. will be called I-V-terms. 
The ML-sentences constructed from formulas of set theory by replacing variables 
by 7-V-terms or the term 'D1' will be called I-V- sentences. 
So called I-V-translations of L-formulas will be defined in the following way: 
Definition 5. 
( l ) / / 'A' is a k-ary predicate and 'At\ ..., 'Ak are individual terms, then the 
I-V- translation of'A(Au ..., Ak)' is the ML-sentence 
'^(A^.^Vy^yevyW. 
(2) If 'A' and 'B' are individual terms, then the I-V-translation of 'A '= B' is the 
ML-sentence 'vv(A) = vv(B)'. 
(i)lf 'A' is a formula and 'sf' is its I-V-translation, then the I-V-translation of 
'""1.4: is the ML-sentence ' ~s4'. 
(4) / / 'A' and ' £ ' are formulas a W and '& are their I-V-translations, then the 
I-V-translation of'A =>B' is the ML-sentence,'stf -» J" . 
(5) If 'A' is a formula, 's/' is its I-V-translation and 'x ; ' is q variable, then the 7 




We use the following symbols as the variables for metaexpressions 
s/,38,(tg,2),s/u381,
(g1,®1,s/2,... 
Obviously, to every L-formula there is exactly one I-V-translation of this formula 
and vice versa (to every bound L-variable 'x ; ' is assigned the bounded ML-variable 
'a,'). The set of 7-V-translations is a'proper subset of the set of J-V-sentences. 
A fundamental relation between the value of L-formula 'A' in I and V and the 
LV-translation of 'A' is expressed by the following theorem: . » • 
Theorem 1. / / 'A' is a formula and's/' is its I-V-translation, then 
vv(A) = t = sJ and 
v¥(A)=f = ~sf. 
It follows immediately from Definitions 3 and 5. 
Theorem 1 gives the possibility of reformulation of Definition 4. 
Theorem 2. / / 'A' is an L-formula and 's/' is its I-V-translation, then 
VER\A) = (V1) s/ , • 
FALS'(A) = ( V 7 ) ~ j / . , ' '..".', 
L-VER(A) =(I)(V)s/, • ' ' ' 
L-FALS(A) =(l)(V)~s/ . 
Theorem 3. If'A' and 'B' are L-formulas and 's/' and '3d' are their I-V-transla-
tions, then ( , -<• '* . • . - . 
EQ\A, B) = (V1) (s/ = 38), 
L-EQ(A,B) = (l)(V)(s/ = 3§). 
The following theorem has an important role in our considerations: . , 
8 Theorem 4. If ' .s/ ' is a K-U-sentence containing exactly K-U-terms ' 4 ( A i ) \ ... 
..., 'vv(At)' and possibly '£>*', then 
(I) (V) \_^(D\ vl(A,),..., vl(A$ (K\I, U/V)] = 
(/,) (a.) . . . (a() *?(D*\p, ^ (AO/a . , • • -, «£0-.)/««) 
P + 0 col1 aV 
where 'off' is 'age p', if 'Ag is an individual term and 'off' is a cz P x ... x p 
if 'Ag' is a k-ary predicate. k-tlmes 
(By 's4(K\l, U/V)' we mean the result of replacing Kbyl and U by Vin the K-U-
sentence W ) . 
Proof. Every interpretation J and every valuation V define an infinite sequence 
of entities 
D1, vv(Px), .., vv(Pm), vY(ai), ..., vv(an), vv(Xi), ..., vv(xp), ... 
For the i-V-sentence '&#' only the values of terms contained in it are relevant. There-
fore, the validity of ' j / ' for every I and V means its validity for every (i + l)-tuple: 
D1, 4041),--., 4(A) • 
All these (i + 1) tuples have only one common property: 
D1 * 0 and 
vv(Ag) e D
l, if 'Ag is an individual term and 
vv(Ag) e D
1 x ... x D1, if 'Ag is a k-ary predicate, 
k-times 
Therefore, we can equivalently express the validity of W for every of these (i + 1)-
tuples by the statement on the right side of the proved equivalence. 
It follows from Theorems 4 and 2 that we can formulate the concepts of logical 
truth and logical falsehood as follows: 
Theorem 5. If 'A' is an L-formula and 's4' is its I-V-translation containing 
exactly the terms ' 4 ( A i ) \ •••, lvv(A)' and possibly 'D
1', then 
L-VER(A) = (P) (a() ... (a() ^(D% vv(A^\au .., vv(A)\a) , 
P # 0 off off 
L-FALS(A) = (P) (a() . . . (a() ~ s f ( D % i# .4 . ) /a . , . . , 4 ( ^ ) / « . ) . 
p + Qoff a>p> 
(The conditions 'off' are the same as in Theorem 4.) 
Second part of Theorem 5 is obvious by the equivalence 
L-FALS(A) = L-VER(lA) = (I) (V) ~ sH . 
As a corrollary to Theorem 4 we obtain 
Theorem 6. If 'stf' is a K-V'-sentence containing, among its terms, the term lvv(A)\ 
then 
(I) (V) [s/(4(A)) (Kjl, U/V)] = (/) (V) [( (a) (v*(A)l«)) (Kjl, U/V)] . 
If we can replace every term in a sentence ts/' by a "generalized variable", then 
we can surely replace one term only. Of course, the quatifiers (I) and (V) cannot be 
dropped (the sentence contains at least the term for domain D1). 
5. STRONG EQUIVALENCE 
In the present section an attempt is made to formulate the intuitively adequate 
conditions under which two formulas speak about the same state of affairs. In [6] 
and [7] the concept of extensional isomorphism of two sentences (in I an V) was 
formulated. Now, we must formulate these concepts for formulas of L (which may 
be open formulas). 
We denote the relation of extensional isomorphism of two formulas lA' and 'B' in 
7 and Vby lEISv(A, B)'. 
Definition 6. If'A' and 'B' are L-formulas, the EIS'V(A, B), iff there are constants 
or variables free in 'A': 'At', ..., 'A? and there are constants or variables free in 
'B' : ' B / , . . . , 'Bt, such that 
vv(A^) = Vyfti) and ... and vv(At) = Vy(Bt) 
and 
iAt = iB(B1lAu...,BtlAi)\ 
In many cases it seems to agree with our intuition that L-formulas speak about 
the same state of affairs, when the first of them results from the second one by replacing 
terms with the same value in J and V But not only such formulas speak about the 
same state of affairs. Obviously, the formulas 
' P ^ x , ) ' and ' P ^ x J . P ^ x , ) ' and 'P^yJ . Pl(y1)' 
speak about the same state of affairs in I and V, if 
vv(xi) - uVCvi) 
holds. The second formula is a simple "logical transformation", of the first one and 
the third formula is extensionally isomorphic (in I and V) with the second one. 
Therefore, we formulate a generalized concept Of identity of states of affairs, namely 
the concept of "+strong equivalence in I and V" (symbolically ' +STREQV), in the 
following manner: 
Definition 7. If 'A' and 'S* are L-formulas, then +STREQV(A, B), iff thefeare 
L-formulas 'C and 'D' such that: EIS'V(A, C) and EISV(B, D) and L-EQ(C, D). 
But this concept is too broad. The formulas ' •• 
'xj = x2 and 'xt = xt' 
are +STREQ in I and V, when vr(x.i) = vv(x2) holds. This seems not to agree with 
intuition. The second sentence is logically true, the first sentence is only satisfied in 
/ and V. The first formula results from the second one (or vice versa) by replacing 
the variable 'x2 by the variable 'x t ' . But the variable 'x2 is "essentially contained" 
in the first formula, whereas 'x . ' is contained in the second formula unessentially 
('xx ' can be replaced in the second formula — in all its occurrence — by any other 
variable "salva veritate"). 
Therefore, we define the relation of strong equivalence in a different manner; but 
first we must formulate the concept of essential and unessential occurence of a term 
in a formula. 
Definition 8. If 'A' is an L-formula and 'B' is a-constant or variable free in 'A', 
then 
'A' essentially contains 'B', iff(El)(EV)[sf EJE (a) ^(v'v(B)J!x)] 
C0£r 
where 'afDl' is customary and 'stf' is the I-V-translation of 'A'. 
The new concept of strong equivalence (STREQ) is now defined as follows: 
Definition 9. If 'A' and 'B' are L-formulas, then STREQ'V(A, B) iff two following 
conditions are satisfied: 
1. +STREQ'v(A,B)and 
2. for every'C contained essentially,in 'A' there is 'D' essentially contained in 'B' 
such that v'v(C) — v'v(D) and vice versa (where 'C is a constantt or a variable 
free in 'A' and 'D' is a constant or a variable free in 'B')f 
In contrast to +STREQ the following holds (under condition Vy(x^) = v'v(x2)): 
~STREQv(xx =- x2, Xj, = xt) . 
* This concept of strong equivalence is one of three concepts proposed in [6; 7], where it was 
denoted by STREQ0. • 
In general, the extensional isomorphism does not imply the strong equivalence of two 1-
formulas. - . , 
Theorem 7. There are L-formulas 'A' and 'B' and there are I and V such that: 
EISY(A, B) & ~ STREQV(A, B). 
Theorem 8. If 'A' and 'B' are L-formulas, then 
L-EQ(A ,B) -» STREQV(A, B) , 
STREQV(A, B) -» EQV(A, B), for every I and V. 
Theorem 9. The relation STREQ is reflexive, symmetric and transitive. 
6. ABSTRACTION 
In the preceding section we have formulated the criterion of having the same state-
values in I and V. We must now give a definition of state of affairs as a set-theoretical 
entity. The state of affairs assigned to a formula (in and / and V) is constructed as 
as a pair of entities designated by members W and '$!' of "abstraction-form" 
of the given formula (more exactly: of "abstraction-form" of the J-V-translation of 
the given formula). The known abstraction principle 
•*(«*, ..., a,) = <a., ..., a;> e 0U ..., fit) j./(a.//*., ..., a ; /^) 
must be used in a different form. It is intuitively adequate that the sentences 'a1 = a2 
and 'a2 — at' have the same states of affairs as values. But, abstraction-forms of 
their i-V-translations have different components 








Left-hand sides of these sentences designate different pairs and, therefore, the states 
of affairs are different too. But an equivalent form of the second sentence is 
«! e D'&a2e D
l 
12 in which the left-hand and the right-hand sides both denote the same objects as the 
components of the first sentence. This equivalence is justified by a variant of abstrac-
tion-principle: 
s/(au ,..,a) = <aPi, ...,aPi> e(ppi, ...Jp) s/falf},, ...,*tlPt) 
where aPl, ..., ap. is a permutation of a., ..., a;. 
We will always use a definite permutation called the lexicographical permutation. 
Let the lexicographical order of 1-V-terms be given as follows: 
(L) v^Pi),..., vv(Pm), vv(ai), ..., vv(an), vv(Xl), ..., Vy(Xp), ... etc . 
Definition 10. The lexicographical permutation of an i-tuple of I-V-terms 
V'V(A ,),...,Vy(At) 
is its permutation, in which each member on the left precedes in the lexicographical 
order (L) each member on the right. 
We denote this lexicographical permutation as follows: 
Vy(ALi),...,Vy(AL). 
In the abstraction-form of each/-V translation the term 'Z)7' occurs in the relation on 
the right-hand side (at least in conditions laid down on abstraction operator). There-
fore, we must subject also the term 'D7 ' to the abstraction procedure. The form of 
abstraction principle for our purposes will be as follows: 
Theorem 10. / / W is an I-V-sentence containing exactly the terms ' ^ ( A j ) ' , . . . 
..., ' ^ (A ; ) ' and possibly the term 'D7 ' , then 
sf(D'tu
ly(A1),...,v^At))s 
= <D7, v'v(AL),..., v'v(AL)> 6 (K, . . . cU s/(D'lf}, t i ' A O K , • • • 
p 4= 0 & a j ^ 1 & . . . & a ) ; L i 
...,vv(A)\a) 
where the conditions 'coJjL9' are customary. 
The result of this abstraction-transformation applied to an 7-V-sentence 'A' will be 
denoted as 'AJ3SL(A)\ It is obvious that 
ABSL(s4) = s4 , under every J and V. 
From the abstraction principle mentioned above and from the principle of exten-
sionality it follows: 
Theorem 11. / / 'si' and 'Si' are K-U-sentences containing the same K-U-terms, 13 
e.g.i'vftAt), . . . . ' ^ (A , ) ' , then 
{P) (a;)..., (a,-) [*?(D"IP, t#.4.)/<-., - > "&*«)/««) = -K-^ /A "R-*IV-«I . -
/? =t= 0 a^1 a)J' 
..., ^(AO/a,] = [ ( f o ..., a;) si(D
K\p, D J X ^ ) / * , , . . . . ^(A,)/a,.) = 
/? * O&w^1 & . . . , & « ; ' 
(j&a. ..., a,) ^(D«//?, og(i-i)/«i. • • - -ft-.)/«i)] • 
,5 4= 0 & cop1 & ... & oj'p' 
Because of validity of Theorem 4 the left-hand side of Theorem 11 means a logical 
equivalence, i.e. an equivalence holding under every J and V. Therefore, we may 
assert (in an abbreviated form): 
Theorem 12. Under the same condition as in Theorem 11: 
( / ) (V ) [ (A = B)(K//,U/V)] = 
[(j5a.. . .«,) st = (j8«i...a.) * ] . 
0 * 0 & to;1 & ... & coy P 4= 0 & coy & ... & col' 
7. REDUCTION 
It may happen that in / and Vthe following equality holds: 
e4{«i) = vv(a3) . 
The sentences 'a , = a2' and 'a3 = a2 are equivalent (and STREQ) in / and V, but 
the abstraction-forms of their J-V-translations contain on the left-hand sides the 
triples: 
(D',vv(a,),v\a2)y and </)', v'(a2), v'(a3)} 
(the /-V-terms are lexicographically ordered), which represent different triples of 
objects. We need a procedure with the result that equivalent I-V-terms (/-V-terms 
with the same denotatum in / and V) have the same place in the lexicographical order 
of /-V-terms. For these purposes we adopt the operation ofl-V- reduction of/-V-terms 
and of J-V-sentences. 
Definition 11. / / 'si' and '3$' are I-V-terms, then 'si' is I-V-reduced term of '<%', 
iff'si' is lexicographically the first member of the set of I-V-terms having the same 
denotatum as '$$'. 
For instance, from the example mentioned above, 'v\(a^)' is /-V-reduced term of 
'vv(a3)' and
 iv'v(al)' is /-V-reduced term of 'vv(a^)\ 
Definition 12. i / 'st' is a T-V-sentence containing exactly 'vy(A^j', ...,^vv(A^' 
and 'vyfti)', ..., 'vv(B^' are theirI-V-reduced terms, then thel-V- reduced form of 
'st' (abbreviated: 'Rv(st)') is the sentence 
* , ) / # : ) , ..., v^At)J^Bt))' . 
Clearly, for every I and V, Rv(st) = st, where 'st' is an J-V-sentence. 
An interesting case for our purposes is when an interpretation and valuation give 
the same reduction as another interpretation and valuation. 
Definition 13.1 and V define an analogical reduction as K and U, iff for every two 
terms, it holds that 'vY(A)' is I-V-r-educed term of'vv(B)', iff'v^(A)' is K-U-reduced 
term of'vl(B)'(abbreviated:'Rv = Rl'). 
We may express the same fact by a ML-condition: 
Theorem 13.1 and V define an analogical reduction as K and U, iff for every two 
L-terms 'A' and 'B' 
Vy(A) = Vy(B) = v
K
v(A) = vl(B) •<• 
holds. 
Proof. The reduction is determined uniquely by equivalences between J-V-terms. 
On the other hand, when stated what is a reduced term for every J-V-term, we can 
determine which of J-V-terms has the same denotatum (the lexicographical order 
is absolute; in no way it depends on J and V). ' 
Therefore, we may consider the condition 'Rv = R*' as a ML-expression. 
Furthermore, a few theorems about reduction will be proved. Evidently, under 
given J and V we replace J-V-terms by J-V-reduced terms, independently on the form 
of sentences; especially: ' 
Theorem 14. If 'st' and '&' are I-V-sentences, then 
Rv(st =<%) = [ R * ( ^ ) ' = Ry{@)~\ . 
Furthermore, we can state the following theorem: 
Theorem 15. If 'st' is a K-U-sentence, then 
(I)(V)[(R^))(Kll,UlV)]= (l)(V)[st(KlI,U\V)\, ...=•.... 
Rv = Ry 
Proof. Let 'st' contain exactly JC-U-terms 'vl(A^',:.., *u*(A/)' and let 'Vu(Bt)',... 
..., ci$(B.)' be their JC-U-reduced terms. -
's/' is therefore 
(1) 's/(vK(Ai),...,v
K(A)y, 




and '(Rl(s/)) (KJI, U/V)' is 
(3) ' sJ(v'v(B,),...,v^(B^)'. , 
(I) The validity of the left-hand side of the equivalence in Theorem 15 means 
(a) WW^Vyfa),...,^). 
For every/ and Vthe sentence (3) holds, which is the result of K-U-reductionOf (l) and 
of replacing of JC-U-reduced terms (in (2)) by corresponding I-V-terms. 
The condition of validity of (3) for every I and V may be, therefore, the K-U-
reduction. From this fact it follows that the sentence 
(4). s/(vY(Al),...,vv(A^) 
holds in I and V satisfying the condition RK = Rv, because exactly in these J and 
Vthe terms 'vy(A^\ ..., 'vv(A$ are equivalent with terms 'vv(B^)\ ...,'vv(B)'. 
Therefore, it holds . •, ; 
RV = Ry 
(II) On the other hand, if (b) holds and if we apply to the sentence 's/(KJI, U/V)' 
an J-V-reduction analogical with JC-U-reduction, we obtain the sentence (3) holding 
for every 7 and V satisfying Rv = R
K. But this condition was in (3) already satisfied 
(all original terms were replaced by reduced terms) and, therefore, it can be dropped. 
The validity of (a) follows. 
Theorem 16. If'A' and 'B' are L-formulas and 's/' and '28' are their K-U-transla-
tions, then 
+STREQK(A, B) = (/) (V) [ (R*0O = RKV(3S)) (KJI, U/V)] . 
Proof. (I) The left-hand side of the equivalence means that there are L-formulas 
'C and 'D' such that EISK(A, C) and EISK(B, D) and L-EQ(C, D). Let 'C*' and 
'£>*' be such L-formulas and let ' f *' and *<&*' be their K-U-translations. Therefore, 
it holds: ' 
(1) EISK(A,C*) and EISl(B, D*) and L-EQ(C*,D*). 
W It is obvious that K-U-reduced translations of L-formulas, which are EIS in K and 
U, must be identical: 
(2) <Rv(s/)' = «**(**)• 
and 
(3) '*£(<*)' = '/?£(<&*)'. 
From (l) it follows also 
(4) (I)(V)l(V* = ®*)(Kll,UJV)]. 
Each reduction can — at most — identify some terms. Therefore, if (4) holds, it 
must hold also 
(5) (/) (V) [(**(**) = RKV(2*)) (Kjl, U/V)] 
(this can be seen also from Theorem 15 and from obvious specification of (44)). 
Because of (2) and (3), from (5) it follows: 
(6) (I)(V)[(RKW = R«(®))(Kll,Ulvy]. 
(II) Let us suppose the validity of the right-hand side of the equivalence (i.e. the 
validity of (6)). The K-U-reduced form of W and 'J" are surely K-U-translations of 
some L-formulas. Let us designate the L-formula, the iC-U-translation of which is 
'R£;(j/)' as 'A*' and the L-formula the K-U-translation of which is 'R^(^)' the 
K-U-translation as '£*'. Because of (6) we have 
(1) L-EQ(A*, B*) 
Furthermore, it is obvious that L-formulas 'A ' and 'A*' on the one hand and 'B' and 
'B*' on the other hand may differ by one aspect only: on the place where one formula 
contains a term, the other can at most contain an another but K-U-equivalent term 
(a term with the same value in K an U). Therefore, it holds in agreement with the 
definition of EIS: 
(2) EISf,(A,A*) and EIS^(B, B*) . 
If we now consider (l) with (2) together, we can say that 
(3) there are L-formulas ' C and 'D' (i.e. 'A*' and 'B*') such that (l) and (2) hold. 
The validity of (3) means that 
(4) +STREQ«(A,B). 
Theorem 17Jj 'A' and 'B' are L-formulas and 'si' and '33' are their K-U-trans- 17 
lations, then 
+ STREQV(A, B) = (I) (V) [(si = 'sM) (Kjl, U/V)] . 
Ry = Rv 
This theorem follows immediately from Theorems 16 and 14. 
8. ELIMINATION 
If we construct the states of affairs from denotata of two components of abstraction-
form of the reduced TV-translation, we obtain a result not corresponding to our 
intuition (such result represents the first variant of the definition of states of affairs 
in [7]). First: different states of affairs are assigned to the sentences 'al — a / and 
'a2 = a2, one containing the denotatum o f ' a ^ the second the denotatum of 'a2. But 
both sentences are logically equivalent and we will say that they speak about the 
same thing. Furthermore, the sentence '(P^a^ . Pi(a2)) + Ti(ai)' is logically 
equivalent to 'P^fa^f, but we obtain different states of affairs: the state of affairs 
for the first sentence contains the denotatum of 'a2 in contrast to the state of affairs 
assigned tho the second sentence. But what the first sentence says about the denotatum 
of 'a2, can be said about everything. 
When we take into account only "essential" occurrences of L-terms, our difficulties 
disappear. The sentences 'a1 = at' and 'a2 = a2 contain ' a . ' and 'a2 unessentially. 
The first of the last couple of sentences mentioned contains ' P , ' and a t essentially, 
but it contains 'a2 unessentially. Therefore, we must eliminate the terms contained 
unessentially. 
We define the meaning of "to contain essentially" and "to contain unessentially" 
for TV-sentences: 
Definition 14. If 'si' is a K-U-sentence and 'S3' is a K-U-term, then 'si' essentially 
contains '£%', iff 
(EI)(EV)[(si EJE (a) si(®ja))(K\l, U/V)] 
OfDK 
and 'si' does not contain essentially '&', iff 
(l)(V)[(si = (a)si(^))(Kll,U(V)] 
OfDK 
where 'ofDK is customary. 
Definition 15. If 'si' is a K-U-sentence and ' J " is a K-U-term, then 'si' contains 
unessentially 'S3', iff'si' contains ' J " but not essentially. 
18 Definition 16. If 's4' is a K-U-sentence containing unessentially exactly the 






We must separately define the essential (unessential) occurrence of the term 'DK' 
and its possible elimination, because it can appear in the iC-U-sentence first after the 
mentioned elimination (we can see this from the conditions 'CH^V in the first eliminated 
form). 
Definition 17. If'38' is 'ELIM^si)', where 'sd' is a K-U-sentence and '38' contains 
'DK\ then '38' contains essentially 'DK\ iff 
(El)(EV)\{38 $ (/J) <M(DK\fS))(K\l,U\V)\ 
P + 0 
and '38' contains unessentially 'DK\ iff 
( l ) ( V ) [ ( - f « 08) 38(DK\H))(K\l,U\V)\. 
j S * 0 
Definition 18. If '38' is 'ELlMx(stf)\ where W is a K-U-sentence, then the second 
eliminated form of'38' (abbreviated: 'ELIM2(38)') is 
1. '(0) 38(DKI0)\ when '38' contains 'DK' unessentially and 
j 3 * 0 
2. '38', when '38' does not contain 'DK' or contains it essentially. 
Instead of iELIM2(ELIM1(si))' we will write 'ELIM(stf)\ 
It is obvious that 
Theorem 18. If si' is a K-U-sentence, then (I) (V) [(ELIM(si) = si) (K\l, U/V)]. 
An auxiliary concept will be usefull: 
Definition 19. If si' is a K-U-sentence containing exactly K-U-terms ' ^ ( A j ) ' , . . . 
..., 'vK(A^)' and possibly 'DK\ then the totally generalized form of si' (abbreviated: 
'TG(si)') is 
•(ft) (a,) ... («,) si(DK\fl, vKv(At)\ai, ..., v
K(A^ . 
P + 0 cof col' 
It is clear that 
Theorem 19. i / 'sf' is a K-U-sentence and 'ELIM(sf)' contains no K-U-term and 19 
does not contain 'DK', it holds: 
1. sf(K\l, U\V) = TG(sf),for every I and V, 
2. 'ELIM(sf)' = 'TG(sf)\ 
We can now reformulate Theorems 4 and 5 briefly as follows: 
Theorem 20. / / 'sf' is a K-U-sentence, then 
l.(l)(V)[sf(KJI,U\V)=TG(sf)-], 
2. (l)(V)[~sf(K\l,U\V)= TG(~sf)l 
Theorem 21. If 'sf' is the K-U-translation of an L-formula 'sf', then 
1. L-VER(A) = TG(sf), 
2. L-FALS(A) = TG(~sf). 
We now define the analytic and the synthetic formulas as follows: 
Definition 20. 7/ 'sf' is the K-U-translation of a formula 'A', then 
1. ANAL(A) = TG(sf) v TG(~sf), 
2. SYNT(A) = ~ANAL(A). 
9. STATES OF AFFAIRS 
We now define the states of affairs in the following manner (the abbreviation 
'^(A)' means: the state of affairs assigned to an L-formula 'A' under given inter-
pretation I and valuation V): 
Definition 21. If'A' is an L-formula and SYNT(A) and 'sf' is its I-V-translation, 
then 
9>lv(A) = <<x, p}, if 'a e /?' = 'ABS
L(R,v(ELIM(sf)))' . 
From Theorem 10, exhibiting the operation ABSL in detail, we see: 
Theorem 22. / / 'A' is an L-formula and SYNT(A) and 'sf' is its I-V-translation 
then S^y(A) is the ordered pair construed of 
<D' , / K (A L i ) , . . . ,4 (A L i )> 
and of 
(Hu • • • *L.) [(Rv(ELIM(sf))) (D'lfS, 4 ( A ) / a „ • • -, 4(A.)/a,)] 
0 * 0&co7-'&...&a>; i- ( 
where 'co^5' is a customary condition and the terms 't^(Ai)', ..., 'vTv(A^)' are all 
different I-V-terms, which remain in 'Rrv(ELIM(s/))'. 
The formal justification of the definition shows the following 
Theorem 23. If 'A' is an L-formula and SYNT(A), then there exists the unique 
a such that a = S?V(A) 
Proof. I f 'A ' is synthetic, then neither 'TG(s?)' nor 'TG(~ s/)' holds, i.e. 'ELIM(s^y 
is different from 'TG(s#)\ The sentence 'ELIM(s#)' contains, therefore, at least one 
7-V-term or 'D1'. This term must remain also after application of reduction (a reduction 
can only diminish the number of terms contained, but cannot remove them) and 
after application of abstraction. Therefore, there exist the first member and the second 
member of the pair <a, /?>. Furthermore, the members a and /? are unique, because of 
univocality of J-V-translation, elimination, reduction and lexicographical abstraction. 
For analytic formulas there are no states of affairs (they "speak" about the same 
thing, namely, "about nothing"). Analytic sentences contain all terms unessentially 
(theirl-V-translation contains unessentially also 'D1'). All terms and 'D1', therefore, 
must be eliminated and we cannot apply the operation of abstraction. 
We have seen that a state of affairs is a set-theoretical entity, namely a construct 
of relational structures. We call two relational structures 
</?, xu ..., a;> and </T, a[, ..., a-> 
similar, if i = j" and if for every ag and a'g it holds off = co
x
p'
9 (these conditions are 
customary). 
We can state that every state of affairs is a pair consisting of one structure SA and 
of the set of structures TA: 
<S-4, T^> 
where each structure of TA is similar to SA and satisfying the formula 
(R'v(ELIM(sJ))) (D'lp, i ^ O / a t , ..., 4(^.)/«.) 
(the structure SA is determined by a formula 'A', interpretation I and valuation V). 
The great disadvantage of our construction of states of affairs is their relative 
existence. We can construct a state of affairs only for a given formula under given 
I and V. We need "absolute" states of affairs existing independently of formulas. 
This will be an object of our further investigations. A possibility of such a formulation 
gives us the foregoing note on structures. 
10. ADEQUACY 
The construction of states of affairs is too complicated for an examination from the 
point of view of intuitive adequacy. But we have defined the relation of strong 
equivalence which represents a proposal of formulation of what we mean when we 
say that two sentences speak about the same thing (about the same state of affairs).* 
Therefore, we can exhibit some relative intuitive adequacy of our construction of 
states of affairs with respect to the relation of strong equivalence. Such an adequacy 
states the following theorem: 
Theorem 24. (Adequacy theorem). If ' A ' and 'B' are synthetic L-formulas and 
W and ' J " are their K-U-translations, then 
STREQl(A, B) = STl(A) = S*K(B) . 
Proof. (I) First we suppose 
(1) STREQK(A, B) . 
This means the conjunction of 
(2) +STREQK(A,B) 
and 
(3) for every ' C essentially contained in ' A ' there is a 'D' essentially contained in 'B' 
such that vK(C) = vK(D) and vice versa (where: ' C is a constant or variable free 
in ' A ' and 'D' is a constant or variable free in '-B'). 
The assumption (2) is by Theorem 17 first equivalent to 
(4) ( i ) ( F ) K [ ( * r - ^ ) ( K / / , U / F ) ] 
Ry = Rv 
and by Theorem 18 to 
(5) (/) (V) [(ELIM(jtf) = EUM(a)) (Kjl, U/V)] . 
Ry = RJJ 
This can be writen equivalently (by Theorems 14 and 15) as: 
(6) (I) (V) [(RK(ELIM(^)) = RKV(EL1M(®))) (Kjl, U/V)] . 
The second part of assumption (3) holds also for translations: 
(7) For every term 'vK(C)' contained essentially in 's/' there is a term 'vl(D)' essen-
tially contained in '08' such that vK(C) = vK(D) and vice versa. 
The operation ELIM now eliminates the terms contained unessentially and, therefore, 
we obtain a result equivalent to (7): 
(8) For every term 'vK(C)' contained in 'ELIM^)' there is a term 'vK(D)' contained 
in lELIM(38y such that vK(C) = vK(D) and vice versa. 
* More detailed discussion of these intuitive ideas is in [6] and [7]. 
22 The iC-U-reduction now identifies these terms denoting the same thing and, therefore, 
we have equivalently: 
(9) eRK(ELIM(sf))' and 'RK(ELIM(@))' contain the same K-U-terms. 
Let now the terms mentioned in (9) be ' [^(A^' , . . . , 'y*(A ;) ' and possibly 'D
K'. 
From the fact (9) and from the equivalence (6) it follows by Theorem 12 that the 
relations obtained by the operation ABSL on the right-hand sides of abstraction-
forms are identical: 
(10) (faLl ... aLi) [(R
K(ELIM(^))) (DK\p, vKv(A,)\au ..., v
K(A^] = 
P * 0 & co^1 & ... & co^1 
= (M. . . . . aL() (R
K(ELIM(®))) (DKjp, ^ ( A O K ..., <(A ;)/a ;)] . 
P 4= 0&co; L '& . . .&a ; ; L i 
Furthermore, it follows from (9) that the (i + l)-tuples on both left-hand sides in 
abstraction-forms of sentences mentioned in (9) must be identical and must be 
expressed by identical expressions 
(11) (DK,vK(ALl),...,v
K(AL)} 
(they must always exist because the starting sentences are synthetic; in the case 
i = 0 they must contain only 'DK'). 
From this fact and from (10) it follows by means of definition of states of affairs 
that 
(12) <7K(A) = K(B). 
(II) We must now prove that (12) implies (l). We suppose (12). We denote the 
mentioned states of affairs as <a, /?> and <a', /?'>. Therefore, it holds 
(13) <a, py = <a', p'y, 
i.e. 
(14) a = a' and p = /?' . 
* From the definition of states of affairs SfK(A) and £fK(B) we can see that the identity 
'P = P" must have the form (10) above and 'a = a" must have the form of identity 
between two identical (i + l)-tuples, both denoted by the expression (11) above (in 
agreement with construction of states of affairs the terms in (11) are reduced and, 
therefore, the terms denoting the same objects are the same terms). From (10) and 
from the fact that a and a' are signed by the same expression (11) the validity of (6) 
follows immediately by Theorem 12 above and (6) is equivalent — as we have seen — 
to 
(15) +STREQK(A, B). 
The statement (9) also holds (it follows from identity of expressions for a and a'), 23 
and is equivalent to (3). These two facts give together the validity of 
(16) STREQl(A, B). 
The theorem of adequacy shows that the concept of state of affairs is adequate 
with respect to the relation STREQ. If two formulas are STREQ in / and V, then the 
states of affairs assigned to these formulas in I and V are the same and vice versa. 
In [6] and [7] two other variants of the concept of STREQ and of the concept of 
state of affairs are exhibited. 
11. STATE FUNCTIONS AND FACTS 
It is customary to say that each given L-formula ' A ' represents a truth-value 
function, i.e. a function assigning to every pair / and Va truth value. Let ' A ' contain 
two constants or variables 'B^ and lB2. We often express the function mentioned by 
the table: 











Now, we have a new sort of such semantic functions. Each given synthetic formula 
represents a function assigning to each pair I and V a state of affairs. This expresses 
the table (where A(BU B2) is a synthetic formula): 










We call such functions the state-functions. Each synthetic formula thus represents 
a state-function. 
When we will study the relation between truth-value functions and state functions, 
we must introduce a new concept. Intuitively, not all states of affairs are "real states". 
24 Only those are real which correspond to true synthetic sentences (or: which are 
assigned to a synthetic formula, when its value is truth). We will call them facts. We 
define the class TACT which will have as members these facts. 
Definition 22. 
a 6 TACT s (EI) (EV) (EA) [a = £"V(A)& a = (p, y) & jS e y~\ 
where ' A ' is a synthetic formula. 
Therefore, facts are such states of affairs </?, y>, for which P ey. Other states of 
affairs are non-facts (i.e. when p <fc y). 
From our constructions it is easy to see that 
Theorem 25. i / ' A ' is a synthetic L-formula and 'stf' is its I-V-translation, then 
£>>y(A) 6 TACT = s/ = vv(A) = t, 
yv(A)$FACT= ~s4 = vl(A) = / . 
(When we take lABSL(Rv(ELIM(s4?))y as '/3 e y\ it is clear that P e y = sf, because 
evidently ABSL(Rv(ELIM(stf))) = sJ; and <£, y> = S"y(A).) 
This gives us a new expression for truth-value function represented by synthetic 
formulas and we can reformulate semantic definitions as follows: 
Theorem 26. If ' A ' is a synthetic L-formula, then 
' A ' is satisfied in I and V = £?TV(A) e TACT, 
VER'(A) = (V) £?'y(A) e TACT, 
FALS'(A) = (V) S"y(A) $ FACT. 
The truth-functions of propositional logic can be redefined in the case of synthetic 
formulas: 
Theorem 27. 7/ ' A ' and 'B' are synthetic L-formulas, then 
£fv(A =>B)e FACT = £fv(A) e FACT-* £?V(B) e TACT,' 
£fv(A . B) e TACT = £fv(A) e FACT & £fv(B) e TACT, 
S*\(A + B) e TACT = £f'v(A) e FACT v S"V(B) e TACT, 
£fv(A oB)e FACT = S"y(A) e FACT = £?V(B) e FACT, 
£f\(HA) e TACT = y'v(A) $FACT. 
It is possible that the mentioned procedure enables us to solve certain questions 
about so called non-extensional contexts. It is known that the following statements 
do not hold: 
A o B = It is necessary that Aolt is necessary that B , 
AoB = It is believed that Aolt is believed that B . 
But what is "necessary" or what is "believed"? Is it a truth value? In my opinion, we 
assert that a state of affairs is necessary a fact and it is also an entity which is believed 
to be a fact. For synthetic formulas it holds: 
STREQV(A, B) = It is necessary that S*V(A) e FACT = 
= It is necessary that SPV(B) e FACT, 
STREQV(A, B) = It is believed that £f\(A) e FACT = 
= It is believed that ^v(B)eFACT. 
The main direction of our further investigations will be a construction of states of 
affairs independently of formulas. This will make possible a reconstruction of the 
foundations of logical semantics and many interesting applications. 
(Received April 12, 1974.) 
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